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Introduction
To say that “corruption” is an enemy to progress and development
would strike many as tautology.  But despite the obvious danger that cor-
ruption poses to a well-functioning society, in the United States and (more
so) abroad, the law has only recently shifted toward regulating conduct
that may be deemed corrupt where it occurs at the hands of domestic
actors operating abroad.  Indeed, until recently sums paid as foreign bribes
were valid tax deductions in many countries.1  In 1977, however, the
United States passed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act (FCPA) and thereby
set what has become a global standard for regulating corrupt activities.  Or
at least what the United States deems “corrupt.”
Much of the difficulty that corruption presents from a regulatory
standpoint is that activities that are considered improper in certain parts
of the world would not be thought of as such in other regions.  Indeed,
commentators note that we should not analyze corruption in absolute
moral terms; instead, we must address problems with the improper use of
power in light of surrounding social, economic, and political contexts.2
Practically speaking, what is a gift in one society may be a bribe in
another.  What may be corporate lobbying in one polity may be an unfair
purchase of political power in another.  And what may be the cost of doing
business in one economy may be a systemic flaw in another.
In the face of these nuances, however, the United States government
has vigorously enforced the FCPA across the world, bringing within its
grasp activities that may carry only a tangential link to the states.  With
this in mind, whether the current approach to FCPA enforcement is a valid
regulatory effort or, alternatively, an act of legal imperialism becomes an
inevitable question.  In this Note, I will explore these notions through a
practical lens, arguing that U.S. courts, when given the opportunity to over-
see an FCPA prosecution, should place limitations on its extraterritorial
reach in light of the interests of foreign jurisdictions, business, and foreign
relations.  In Part I, I provide a brief history of the FCPA, including how it
developed in Congress as well as how the government has interpreted the
Act.  In Part II, I propose a framework as to how courts should analyze
personal jurisdiction in FCPA cases.  In Part III, I discuss how courts
should analyze prescriptive jurisdiction under the FCPA and the interests
that courts should consider when (and if) they are deciding whether to
limit the extraterritorial reach of the FCPA.
1. Sharon Eicher, Introduction: What Corruption is and Why it Matters, in CORRUP-
TION IN INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS: THE CHALLENGE OF CULTURAL AND LEGAL DIVERSITY 1, 2
(Sharon Eicher ed., 2009).
2. See, e.g., John Gledhill, Corruption as the Mirror of the State in Latin America, in
BETWEEN MORALITY AND THE LAW 155, 156 (Italo Pardo ed., 2004) (“[C]orruption must
not be analysed in a moralizing framework but must be seen as a mode of exercizing
power within complex social and political settings that must be analysed carefully and
in their historical and cultural specificity.”).
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I. Historical Development of the FCPA’s Reach
A. Statutory Development
The FCPA regulates two illicit corporate activities: bribery and false or
inaccurate accounting.3  The FCPA’s antibribery provisions proscribe pay-
ments that are made with “corrupt intent” to obtain or retain business and
are made to “foreign officials” operating in their “official capacity.”4  These
provisions include three jurisdictional hooks, which make them applicable
to “domestic concerns” (U.S. persons and businesses), U.S. “issuers” (U.S.
and foreign public companies listed on stock exchanges in the United
States or that are required to file periodic reports with the Securities and
Exchange Commission), and, under the FCPA’s “territorial jurisdiction,”
foreign individuals and businesses committing certain acts within U.S. ter-
ritories.5  The accounting provisions require maintenance of accurate
books and records, as well as systems of internal accounting controls; they
also prohibit knowingly falsifying books and records or failing to maintain
internal control systems.6  The accounting provisions, however, have a
much narrower jurisdictional reach than the antibribery regulations, apply-
ing only to U.S. issuers.7
Despite the broad jurisdictional reach that the FCPA’s antibribery pro-
visions now contain— allowing U.S. prosecution of almost entirely foreign
conduct— Congress originally enacted the antibribery provisions in 19778
in response to foreign mistrust of American corporations.  This mistrust
was due in no small part to the Watergate scandal, which led to public
scrutiny of American corruption.9  In assessing the merits of the FCPA, the
Senate reported that the SEC discovered over 400 U.S. corporations respon-
sible for corrupt foreign payments, implicating hundreds of millions of
U.S. dollars.10  In light of this, “[f]oreign governments friendly to the
United States . . . ha[d] come under intense pressure from their own peo-
ple,” and “[t]he image of American democracy abroad ha[d] been tar-
nished.”11  Congress thus felt obligated to rein in American corporate
corruption overseas out of self-interest, especially because of “the fact that
[although] the payments which [the Act] would prohibit are made to for-
3. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-1 to -3 (2012); id. § 78m.
4. Id. §§ 78dd-1 to -3; CRIMINAL DIV. OF THE U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & ENFORCEMENT
DIV. OF THE U.S. SEC. AND EXCH. COMM’N, A RESOURCE GUIDE TO THE U.S. FOREIGN COR-
RUPT PRACTICES ACT 2 (2012), www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa [hereinafter DOJ &
SEC GUIDE].  These provisions do not apply to “so-called grease or facilitating pay-
ments.” H.R. REP. No. 95-640, at 4 (1977); see, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(b) (exception for
routine governmental action).  They include two affirmative defenses for payments that
are legal under the law of the foreign official’s country or otherwise “reasonable and
bona fide.”  15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c).
5. DOJ & SEC GUIDE, supra note 4, at 10– 11. R
6. See 15 U.S.C. § 78m.
7. See id.
8. See Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494.
9. See S. REP. NO. 105-277 (1998); Bill Shaw, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act and
Progeny: Morally Unassailable, 33 CORNELL INT’L L.J. 689, 694 (2000).
10. See S. REP. NO. 95-114, at 3 (1977) (emphasis added).
11. Id. (emphasis added).
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eign officials, in many cases the resulting adverse competitive affects [sic]
are entirely domestic.”12
The FCPA was thus enacted out of a fundamentally domestic concern,
but that soon changed.  Before 1998, the FCPA reflected Congress’s desire
to regulate American businesses’ conduct overseas: the Act only bestowed
jurisdiction over U.S. issuers and domestic concerns; it did not include a
territorial jurisdictional hook and therefore did not bestow jurisdiction to
prosecute foreign actors making foreign bribes that took place in part— if
even tangentially— in the United States.13  Congress quickly realized, how-
ever, that under this scheme, the FCPA placed American businesses at a
disadvantage in the international marketplace, where foreign businesses
and individuals were not only able to bribe foreign officials in furtherance
of business efforts but might even be able to reap tax deductions for such
expenditures.14  Consequently, the United States sought to impose its defi-
nition of “corruption” on international markets in order to “level the play-
ing field,”15 thereby going beyond the initial trust-instilling impetus behind
the FCPA.
Against this backdrop, in 1988 Congress commanded the Executive
Branch to negotiate with the United States’ prominent trading partners in
the Organization of Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) to
pass legislation similar to the FCPA.16  Pursuant to these negotiations, in
1997 the United States and thirty-three other countries entered into the
OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in
International Business Transactions (OECD Convention).17  The OECD
Convention requires signatory countries to criminalize the bribery of for-
eign public officials by “any person” and “to establish . . . jurisdiction . . .
when the offence is committed in whole or in part in its territory.”18  The
OECD Convention also required signatories to pass legislation with a geo-
graphically broad reach; indeed, OECD commentary provided that “[t]he
territorial basis for jurisdiction should be interpreted broadly so that an
extensive physical connection to the bribery act is not required.”19
Pursuant to the OECD Convention, in 1998 Congress amended the
FCPA to bestow territorial jurisdiction over “any person other than an
issuer . . . or a domestic concern . . . or for any officer, director, employee,
or agent of such person or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such
person, while in the territory of the United States, corruptly to make use of
12. H.R. REP. NO. 95-640, at 4 (1977) (emphasis added).
13. See Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100– 418, 102
Stat. 1107.
14. See H.R. REP. NO. 105– 802, at 10 (1998).
15. Id. at 9.
16. STUART H. DEMING, THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT AND THE NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL NORMS 276– 77 (2010).
17. Id.
18. OECD Convention on Combating Bribery of Foreign Public Officials in Interna-
tional Business Transactions, arts. 1, 4, Nov. 21, 1997, 37 I.L.M. 1.
19. OECD, THE CONVENTION ON COMBATING BRIBERY OF FOREIGN PUBLIC OFFICIALS IN
INTERNATIONAL BUSINESS TRANSACTIONS AND RELATED DOCUMENTS 16 (2011).
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the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce or to do
any other act in furtherance of” a prohibited payment.20  Since the 1998
amendment, the DOJ and SEC have followed the OECD Commentary and
have prosecuted foreign actors under the authority of this jurisdictional
hook, perhaps beyond the OECD’s intentions.
B. Prosecutorial Development
As FCPA enforcement has become more vigorous, the U.S. government
continues to push the bounds of the FCPA’s reach.  Indeed, even if in fur-
therance of a wholly foreign payment between wholly foreign parties, so
much as “placing a telephone call or sending an e-mail, text message, or fax
from, to, or through the United States” or “sending a wire transfer from or
to a U.S. bank or otherwise using the U.S. banking system, or traveling
across state borders or internationally to or from the United States” suf-
fices to bring that conduct within the FCPA’s scope, at least in the govern-
ment’s view.21
The DOJ and SEC’s FCPA enforcement practices have operated sub-
stantially without judicial oversight,22 thereby leaving the contours of terri-
torial jurisdiction under the FCPA largely undefined.  The prosecutorial
freedom that the government enjoys in this realm is due not only to the
weighty criminal sanctions that the FCPA carries, which incentivize targets
of FCPA investigations to enter into nonprosecution agreements or plea bar-
gains, but also to lessened punishments for cooperative individuals or cor-
porations that self-report or assist with government investigations.23
Consequently, government prosecutors have almost unilaterally defined
the scope of the FCPA’s territorial jurisdiction.
Given the apathy that an FCPA defendant may have toward a jurisdic-
tional challenge (and not to mention that plea agreements in criminal cases
brought by the DOJ require court approval and thus jurisdiction24), settle-
ments with the government have effectively defined the bounds of the
FCPA’s territorial jurisdiction.  These settlements reveal a drastically broad
reach.  Take United States v. JGC Corp.,25 for example.  In that case, the
Japanese defendant, JGC Corporation (JGC), which is not a U.S. issuer nor
a domestic concern for FCPA purposes, faced DOJ allegations of bribing
20. 15 U.S.C. § 78dd– 3(a) (2012) (amended 1998) (emphasis added).
21. DOJ & SEC GUIDE, supra note 4, at 11. R
22. See DEMING, supra note 16, at 4 (“Any analysis of the FCPA must begin with the R
understanding that its provisions have rarely been subject to judicial scrutiny.”); Sean
Hecker & Margot Laporte, Should FCPA “Territorial” Jurisdiction Reach Extraterritorial
Proportions?, 42 INT’L L. NEWS (Winter 2013), http://www.americanbar.org/publica-
tions/international_law_news/2013/winter/
should_fcpa_territorial_jurisdiction_reach_extraterritorial_proportions.html (“Entities,
often under intense pressure to settle and get FCPA charges behind them, rarely chal-
lenge this aggressive jurisdictional position.”).
23. See Heather Diefenbach, FCPA Enforcement Against Foreign Companies: Does
America Know Best?, 2 CORNELL INT’L L.J. ONLINE 47, 49 (2014).
24. See FED. R. CRIM. P. 11.
25. No. 4:11-cr-00260, 2011 WL 1315939 (S.D. Tex.) (Deferred Prosecution
Agreement).
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\49-2\CIN205.txt unknown Seq: 6 20-SEP-16 12:39
474 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 49
Nigerian officials to obtain government contracts; the only jurisdictional
ties to the United States were that JGC had conspired with an American
joint-venture partner, and that wire transfers— originating in and arriving
at wholly foreign bank accounts— passed through New York bank
accounts.26  Despite this near de minimis link to the United States, upon
court approval, JGC entered into a deferred prosecution agreement, thereby
admitting guilt to the allegations and requiring it to pay a $218 million fine
to the U.S. government, implement a comprehensive antibribery compli-
ance program, and engage a corporate compliance consultant.27
The following parts will endeavor to wrestle with the jurisdictional
limitations that U.S. courts should impose on FCPA prosecutions.  I will
argue that courts should engage in rigorous analyses of both personal
jurisdiction over particular FCPA defendants as well as prescriptive juris-
diction over foreign conduct.  Generally, the slimmer the nexus between
the United States and the defendant or conduct at issue, the less reason the
U.S. government has to apply the FCPA.
II. Personal Jurisdiction Over FCPA Defendants
In order for a U.S. court to have personal jurisdiction over a defendant
in an FCPA prosecution, due process requires that the defendant have some
nexus with the United States such that the defendant has “minimum con-
tacts” with the states and that the exercise of jurisdiction over the defen-
dant is “reasonable.”28  Although few courts have considered the issue,
several have upheld the government’s exorbitant29 assertion of jurisdiction
as not violating due process; but others have limited the FCPA’s reach, par-
ticularly where the government asserts that a nonissuer, nondomestic con-
cern is amenable to prosecution in the United States because it acted in
furtherance of a bribe in U.S. territory.  For example, in United States v.
Patel, the District Court for the District of Columbia dismissed FCPA
26. See Information at 10, 13, 18– 19, United States v. JGC Corp., No. 11-cr-00260
(S.D. Tex. Apr. 6, 2011); Annalisa Leibold, Extraterritorial Application of the FCPA Under
International Law, 51 WILLAMETTE L. REV. 225, 245 (2015).
27. Deferred Prosecution Agreement at 7– 11, JGC Corp., (S.D. Tex.) (No. 4:11-cr-
00260).
28. Int’l Shoe Co. v. State of Wash., 326 U.S. 310, 316– 17 (1945).  “Section 27 of the
[Securities and] Exchange Act, specifically 15 U.S.C. Section 78aa, governs the exercise
of personal jurisdiction in securities cases” and “permits the exercise of personal juris-
diction to the limit of the Due Process Clause of the Fifth Amendment.”  SEC v. Sharef,
924 F. Supp. 2d 539, 544 (S.D.N.Y. 2013) (quoting SEC v. Unifund SAL, 910 F.2d 1028,
1033 (2d Cir. 1990), abrogated on other grounds by Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank, 561
U.S. 247 (2010)).
29. For a definition of “exorbitant jurisdiction,” see Kevin M. Clermont & John R.B.
Palmer, Exorbitant Jurisdiction, 58 ME. L. REV. 474, 476 (2006) (“[W]e might define
exorbitant jurisdiction as jurisdiction exercised validly under a country’s rules that nev-
ertheless appears unreasonable because of the grounds necessarily used to justify juris-
diction.  But we can probably go farther than this subjective test and identify an objective
standard on which accusations of exorbitance tend to rely.  That standard seems to
focus on whether a class of jurisdiction, as opposed to a single assertion of jurisdiction,
is unfair to the defendant because of a lack of significant connection between the sover-
eign and either the parties or the dispute.” (citations omitted)).
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charges against a defendant who was a U.K. citizen and director of a nonis-
suer U.K. corporation.30  The government argued that the court had juris-
diction because the defendant allegedly mailed an agreement related to the
bribe from the United Kingdom to the states; the court rejected this argu-
ment, however, holding that “each act” in furtherance of the bribe must
take place within U.S. territory to satisfy the FCPA’s jurisdictional hook.31
Thus, although the defendant’s conduct may have been physically directed
toward the United States, it was not directed toward impacting U.S. markets
in the sense that the FCPA should condemn.
Even without a robust analysis, the outcome in Patel is intuitively com-
pelling; but two 2013 cases out of the Southern District of New York crys-
tallize the limitations that due process places on the exercise of jurisdiction
in the context of the FCPA.  In SEC v. Straub, Judge Richard Sullivan upheld
jurisdiction in an FCPA case against executives of a Hungarian telecommu-
nications company who allegedly bribed Macedonian public officials
through a Greek intermediary.32  Although the parties involved were
wholly foreign actors, the telecommunication company was listed on the
New York Stock Exchange, so even if the defendants’ alleged conduct was
not “principally directed” at the United States, the conduct was still
“designed to violate United States securities regulations.”33
Conversely, in SEC. v. Sharef, Judge Shira A. Scheindlin dismissed an
FCPA case for lack of personal jurisdiction over the defendant, Herbert
Steffen, a seventy-four year old former executive of a German manufactur-
ing company’s Argentine subsidiary.34  The government alleged that Stef-
fen had encouraged another executive to authorize bribes to Argentinian
officials, which in turn had resulted in falsified SEC filings to conceal the
scheme.35  The court held, however, that Steffen’s contacts with the United
States were “far too attenuated” to satisfy due process, and even if they were
sufficient, haling Steffen into a U.S. court and requiring him to defend
would have been “unreasonable” given his “lack of geographic ties to the
United States, his age, his poor proficiency in English, and the forum’s
diminished interest in adjudicating the matter.”36  The court distinguished
this case from Straub, reasoning that the allegations in that case involved
the defendants personally signing off on false SEC filings; Steffen, on the
other hand, “neither authorized the bribe, nor directed the cover up, much
30. See Leibold, supra note 26, at 246– 47 (citing, inter alia, Indictment at 9, United R
States v. Patel, No. 09-338 (D.D.C. Dec. 11, 2009), Order Granting Motion to Dismiss at
1, United States v. Goncalves, cr-003350RJL4 (D.D.C. Feb. 23, 2012)); Hecker &
Laporte, supra note 22 (citing Trial Transcript at 5:11– 14, 7:17– 8:2, United States v. R
Patel, No. 1:09-cr-00335 (D.D.C. June 6, 2011)).
31. Leibold, supra note 26, at 246 n.110 (quoting FCPA Summer Review 2011, MILLER R
& CHEVALIER (July 13, 2011), http://www.millerchevalier.com/Publications/
MillerChevalierPublications?find=60408)).
32. 921 F. Supp. 2d 244, 255 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
33. Id.
34. 924 F. Supp. 539, 541 (S.D.N.Y. 2013).
35. Id. at 542, 546.
36. Id. at 546– 48.
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less played any role in the falsified filings.”37
Thus, in bestowing personal jurisdiction over foreign defendants
alleged to have violated the FCPA by bribing foreign officials, the dividing
line between Patel and Sharef on the one hand, and Straub on the other, is
where the alleged violation is directed toward impacting U.S. securities mar-
kets such that it would undermine reliance on those markets, thus creating
the requisite minimum contacts between the defendant and the United
States.  To be sure, accepting the government’s allegations in Sharef as true
and assuming that Steffen had encouraged another executive to bribe an
Argentinian official would in itself not establish conduct directed towards
impacting U.S. securities markets; it would remain wholly foreign conduct.
But, as the analysis in Sharef implies, once falsified SEC filings enter the
picture (which in Sharef were not at the hands of Steffen), the United States
would have a valid jurisdictional basis to proceed against the party respon-
sible for the falsified filings.38  And so that we don’t miss the forest for the
trees, we must keep in mind that this dividing line is consistent with the
original rationale behind the FCPA: providing assurance in domestic mar-
kets and preventing domestic adverse effects.39
If the due process limits over FCPA defendants depend on whether a
violation is directed toward impacting U.S. markets, which in my view it
should be, this would render unconstitutional many, if not most, FCPA
prosecutions brought pursuant to the government’s expansive reading of
the FCPA’s jurisdictional scope.  For example, under this principle, the
prosecution of the nonissuer, nondomestic concern in United States v. JGC
Corp. would be beyond the limits of due process because the alleged brib-
ery there was between a Japanese corporation and Nigerian public offi-
cials40 and therefore did not pose the risk of any direct impact on U.S.
markets.  Opponents to this approach could argue that this would eviscer-
ate the 1998 amendments to the FCPA and undermine the rationale behind
those amendments.  For instance, they would argue, the 1998 amendments
were purported to “even the playing field” in foreign jurisdictions that are
loath to pursue bribery prosecutions, and in a case such as JGC Corp., a
U.S. firm could have acquired the highly valuable government contract41 if
not for the advantage that lax foreign bribery prosecution would provide to
foreign firms.  This argument, however, boils down to the ends justifying
37. Id. at 547.
38. See id. (“To be sure, there is ample (and growing) support in case law for the
exercise of jurisdiction over individuals who played a role in falsifying or manipulating
financial statements relied upon by U.S. investors in order to cover up illegal actions
directed entirely at a foreign jurisdiction.” (citing SEC v. Stanard, No Civ. 7736 (S.D.N.Y.
May 16, 2007) (unpublished transcript of ruling, Opp. Ex. 1, Tr. 3: 15– 18); In re
Parmalat Sec. Litig., 376 F. Supp. 2d 449, 455 (S.D.N.Y. 2005); In re CINAR Corp. Sec.
Litig., 186 F. Supp. 2d 279, 306 (E.D.N.Y. 2002)).
39. See supra notes 8– 12 and accompanying text. R
40. JGC Corporation Resolves Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Investigation and Agrees to
Pay a $218.8 Million Criminal Penalty, DEP’T JUST. OFF. PUB. AFF. (Apr. 6, 2011), http://
www.justice.gov/opa/pr/jgc-corporation-resolves-foreign-corrupt-practices-act-investiga
tion-and-agrees-pay-2188.
41. The contracts at issue in the case were valued at over $6 billion. Id.
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the means; and for the sake of legitimacy and foreign relations, U.S. courts
must not countenance such Machiavellian reasoning, especially where the
“means” are unilaterally imposing criminal sanctions on foreign actors by
unduly stretching the bounds of the Constitution, and the “ends” are eas-
ing U.S. firms’ ability to compete in foreign markets.  Indeed, foreign busi-
nesses and governments could interpret this exercise of sovereign power
abroad as an act of legal imperialism that could cripple any improvements
to foreign perceptions of U.S. corporate, political, and jurisprudential cul-
ture resulting from the 1977 enactment of the FCPA.
The foregoing analysis has considered how U.S. courts should grapple
with personal jurisdiction in FCPA cases involving predominately foreign
parties and foreign conduct.  As we’ve seen, this issue implicates notions of
foreign relations, sovereign powers, and, ultimately, the role of the United
States as a regulator of foreign corruption.  But the courts can only do so
much in this arena; in the next Part, I will address the more profound issue
of prescriptive jurisdiction, which asks the question whether the United
States as a sovereign may legitimately regulate foreign conduct as it has
under the FCPA.
III. Prescriptive Jurisdiction Over Foreign Bribery
A. International Law’s Traditional Approach to Prescriptive Jurisdiction
Whereas personal jurisdiction seeks to answer whether a particular
court may assert authority over a particular defendant, prescriptive juris-
diction seeks to answer whether a particular sovereign may validly apply its
law to a given set of facts.42  International law recognizes five traditional
bases for a sovereign to assert jurisdiction to prescribe law: 1) “territorial”
jurisdiction over conduct occurring wholly or substantially within the sov-
ereign’s territory; 2) “nationality” jurisdiction over the conduct of the sov-
ereign’s nationals, whether or not such conduct occurs within its territory;
3) “passive personal” jurisdiction over foreign conduct by non-nationals
that is directed against the sovereign; 4) “protective” jurisdiction over con-
duct that may injure national interests; and 5) “universal” jurisdiction over
conduct that is considered so heinous that any jurisdiction would con-
demn it.43  Beyond this, the sovereign’s exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction
must also be “reasonable,” a standard upon which the Restatement (Third)
of Foreign Relations Law § 403 imposes the following factors “where
appropriate”:
(a) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating state, i.e., the
extent to which the activity takes place within the territory, or has substan-
tial, direct, and foreseeable effect upon or in the territory;
(b) the connections, such as nationality, residence, or economic activity,
between the regulating state and the person principally responsible for the
42. See Anthony J. Colangelo, Essay, What is Extraterritorial Jurisdiction?, 99 COR-
NELL L. REV. 1303, 1304– 05, 1329– 32 (2014).
43. See United States v. Yunis, 681 F. Supp. 896, 899– 900 (D.D.C. 1988); RESTATE-
MENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 402 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
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activity to be regulated, or between that state and those whom the regulation
is designed to protect;
(c) the character of the activity to be regulated, the importance of regulation
to the regulating state, the extent to which other states regulate such activi-
ties, and the degree to which the desirability of such regulation is generally
accepted;
(d) the existence of justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by
the regulation;
(e) the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or
economic system;
(f) the extent to which the regulation is consistent with the traditions of the
international system;
(g) the extent to which another state may have an interest in regulating the
activity; and
(h) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by another state.44
Historically, U.S. courts have limited the extraterritorial reach of U.S.
statutes if not doing so would be “unreasonable”; although the case law on
this point may not have spoken in the language of section 403 per se, it
aimed at the same concern: comity, or a decision to defer to another juris-
diction if that jurisdiction has a greater interest in regulating the underly-
ing primary conduct.45  “Comity” is not a rule of law nor a command from
a higher authority; rather, it is a policy decision among sovereigns to
“recogni[ze] legislative, executive, and judicial acts” of other sovereigns.46
As the following section explains, however, the Supreme Court has
replaced this nuanced approach with a strict presumption against
extraterritoriality.
B. The Supreme Court’s Current Approach to Prescriptive Jurisdiction
In the context of the extraterritorial application of U.S. antitrust regu-
lation, the U.S. Supreme Court has paid homage to comity, holding that
the Sherman Act should only provide a remedy for domestic harms and
therefore that the Act does not reach claims based solely on foreign
injury.47  The Court crafted a rule of statutory construction derived from
section 403, which mandates interpreting “ambiguous statutes to avoid
unreasonable interference with the sovereign authority of other nations.”48
Reasoning that courts should assume that Congress accounts for the “sov-
ereign interests of other nations when they write American laws,” the com-
ity-based rule of construction “helps potentially conflicting laws of
different nations work together in harmony— a harmony particularly
needed in today’s highly interdependent commercial world.”49
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403 (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
45. See id. reporter’s note 2 to § 403 (discussing Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating
Co., 358 U.S. 354, 382– 83 (1959); Lauritzen v. Larsen, 345 U.S. 571 (1953);
Timberlane Lumber Co. v. Bank of Am., 549 F.2d 597, 614 (9th Cir. 1976); United
States v. Aluminum Co. of Am., 148 F.2d 416, 443 (2d Cir. 1945)).
46. See Comity, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014).
47. See F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 163– 64 (2004).
48. Id. at 164.
49. Id. at 164– 65.
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Although the Court has retained an emphasis on statutory interpreta-
tion, it has moved away from a more nuanced, comity-based approach,
instead adopting a one-sided “presumption against extraterritoriality,”
which only considers whether Congress intended a statute to apply extra-
territorially.50  This analysis is “one-sided” because it only considers the
U.S. interest at stake; it does not consider whether another jurisdiction
may have a greater interest in regulating the primary conduct at issue or
whether a foreign jurisdiction may be a more suitable regulator.  The Court
elucidated this rule in Morrison v. National Australia Bank LTD., where the
Court held that the antifraud provision of the Securities Exchange Act does
not apply extraterritorially in favor of foreign plaintiffs bringing claims
against foreign and domestic defendants for misstatements related to
securities listed on foreign exchanges.51
In so holding, the Court overruled the Second Circuit’s longstanding
conduct-and-effects test, which resulted in extraterritorial application of
the antifraud provision if either “the wrongful conduct had a substantial
effect in the United States or upon United States citizens,” or “the wrongful
conduct occurred in the United States.”52  Given the Second Circuit’s famil-
iarity with cases arising out of Wall Street, and its resulting expertise in
federal securities law, the Third, Fifth, Seventh, Eighth, Ninth, and D.C.
Circuits had deferred to the Second Circuit and adopted the conduct-and-
effects test.53  That test sounded in fundamental principles of prescriptive
jurisdiction under international law, such as territorial, passive, personal,
and protective jurisdiction, as well as the Restatement (Third) of Foreign
Relation Law’s additional reasonableness limitation.54  Indeed, the Morri-
son Court acknowledged that the analysis under the conduct-and-effects
test assumed that “[a]s long as [Congress had] prescriptive jurisdiction to
regulate” when passing on the issue whether to apply the antifraud provi-
sion extraterritorially, a court would have to answer whether such applica-
tion “would be reasonable” such that “even . . . ‘predominantly foreign’
transactions became a matter of whether a court thought Congress ‘wished
the precious resources of United States courts and law enforcement agen-
cies to be devoted to them rather than leave the problem to foreign
countries.’ ”55
The Court found the conduct-and-effects test to be problematic, how-
ever, arguing that it was unwieldy, unpredictable, and inconsistent in appli-
50. Morrison v. Nat’l Austl. Bank LTD, 561 U.S. 247, 255– 58 (2010).
51. Id. at 266– 67.
52. Id. at 257– 58 (quoting SEC v. Berger, 322 F.3d 187, 192– 93 (2d Cir. 2003))
(emphasis added).
53. Alex Reed, But I’m an American! A Text-Based Rationale for Dismissing F-Squared
Securities Fraud Claims After Morrison v. National Australia Bank, U. PA. J. BUS. L. 515,
516 (2012) (citing Danielle Kantor, Note, The Limits of Federal Jurisdiction and the F-
Cubed Case: Adjudicating Transnational Securities Disputes in Federal Courts, 65 N.Y.U.
ANN. SURV. AM. L. 839, 866– 68 (2010)).
54. See supra text accompanying note 43. R
55. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 257.
\\jciprod01\productn\C\CIN\49-2\CIN205.txt unknown Seq: 12 20-SEP-16 12:39
480 Cornell International Law Journal Vol. 49
cation.56  More fundamentally, the Court asserted that the test required
courts to engage in a difficult mental exercise of attempting to determine
what Congress would have said had it confronted extraterritoriality in the
first instance, when a “more natural inquiry might be what jurisdiction
Congress in fact thought about and conferred.”57  In light of these con-
cerns, the Court eschewed the sophistication of the conduct-and-effects
test, declaring “rather than guess anew in each case, we apply the presump-
tion [against extraterritoriality] in all cases, preserving a stable back-
ground against which Congress can legislate with predictable effects.”58
C. The Current Approach and its Implications for the FCPA
Although the Court has not ruled on the issue of the FCPA’s extraterri-
torial application, given Morrison’s presumption against extraterritoriality
along with the plain language of the FCPA (i.e., its coverage of U.S. issuers,
domestic concerns, and any conduct in furtherance of a foreign bribe
occurring within U.S. territory), a litigant challenging the extraterritorial
application of the FCPA would likely face an uphill battle.  But the battle
wouldn’t be unwinnable; indeed, countervailing interests could limit the
extraterritorial application of the FCPA.
The FCPA invokes two traditional bases of prescriptive jurisdiction
under international law: nationality jurisdiction and territorial jurisdic-
tion.59  The FCPA’s nationality jurisdiction is embodied in sections 78dd-1
and 78dd-2; as discussed above, its territorial jurisdiction is embodied in
section 78dd-3.60  Given that these jurisdictional hooks would bestow pre-
scriptive jurisdiction to Congress to regulate foreign bribery, a facial appli-
cation of Morrison to the FCPA could result in the statute applying
extraterritorially because it communicates an “ ‘affirmative intention [that]
the Congress clearly expressed’ to give [the] statute extraterritorial
effect.”61  But without considering whether such an application would also
be reasonable, the analysis is incomplete.  Moreover, this further analytical
step does not conflict with Morrison— there, a provision of the federal
securities laws that was ambiguous as to its extraterritorial reach did not
apply abroad in light of the presumption against extraterritoriality.  The
Court pronounced that “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an
extraterritorial application, it has none,”62 but the Court did not hold that
when a statute indicates the possibility of extraterritorial application,
courts may not second-guess such an application where it would be unrea-
sonable.  Indeed, Morrison itself “rests on the perception that Congress
56. Id. at 259– 60.
57. Id. at 260 (quoting Zoelsch v. Arthur Andersen & Co., 824 F.2d 27, 32 (1987)).
58. Id. at 261.
59. See Developments in the Law– – Extraterritoriality, VI. Extraterritorial Law and
International Norm Internalization, 124 HARV. L. REV. 1280, 1286 (2011).
60. See supra notes 3– 7 and accompanying text.
61. Morrison, 561 U.S. at 255 (quoting EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S.
244, 248 (2006)).
62. Id.
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ordinarily legislates with respect to domestic, not foreign matters.”63
Thus, although a court may end its analysis where a statute has no
extraterritorial application on its face, if a statute such as the FCPA com-
municates a Congressional intention to apply extraterritorially, courts
should determine whether a particular application abroad would neverthe-
less be unreasonable.  In such case, courts should look to the section 403
factors.  In the context of the FCPA, six of the section 403 factors are partic-
ularly important: 1) the link of the activity to the territory of the regulating
state; 2) the connections between the regulating state and the person prin-
cipally responsible for the activity to be regulated, or between that state
and those whom the regulation is designed to protect; 3) the existence of
justified expectations that might be protected or hurt by the regulation; 4)
the importance of the regulation to the international political, legal, or eco-
nomic system; 5) the extent to which another state may have an interest in
regulating the activity; and 6) the likelihood of conflict with regulation by
another state.  The following sections will analyze these factors with
respect to the FCPA.
1. The Link of the Activity to the Territory of the Regulating State, i.e., the
Extent to Which the Activity Takes Place Within the Territory, or has
Substantial, Direct, and Foreseeable Effect Upon or in the Territory
Beyond the threshold question of whether a sovereign may exercise
prescriptive jurisdiction to regulate foreign conduct, the reasonableness of
exercising such jurisdiction should sound in more real-world, boots-on-the-
ground terms.64  And, indeed, the degree to which a potential FCPA viola-
tion occurs within a foreign territory bears heavily on such practical con-
siderations because of evidentiary and investigatory hurdles.65  These
difficulties not only burden the government in investigating and prosecut-
ing FCPA cases but may also systemically disadvantage the target of such a
case.66
Government prosecutors rely on three principal methods for obtaining
evidence in FCPA cases: Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLATs); Memo-
randa of Understanding (MOUs); and letters rogatory.67  In theory, MLATs
are intergovernmental agreements that require signatory countries to assist
in government investigations;68 in practice, however, “[t]he United States
has experienced the gamut of cooperation –  from full-scale sharing of
63. Id.
64. Though this factor might also suggest a conduct-and-effects type analysis, the
Morrison Court rejected this approach. See supra notes 50– 58 and accompanying text. R
For doctrinal consistency, my view does not incorporate a similar analysis at this step.
65. See generally Mike Koehler, Navigating the Arcane World of Mutual Legal Assis-
tance Treaties, Letters Rogatory and Evidence-Gathering from Abroad, FCPA PROFESSOR
(May 21, 2014), http://www.fcpaprofessor.com/navigating-the-arcane-world-of-mutual-
legal-assistance-treaties-letters-rogatory-and-evidence-gathering-from-abroad.
66. See Hecker & Laporte, supra note 22. R
67. See Koehler, supra note 65; Nicholas M. McLean, Note, Cross-National Patterns in R
FCPA Enforcement, 121 YALE L.J. 1970, 1987– 88 (2012).
68. McLean, supra note 67, at 1987. R
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domestic investigative files on short notice to outright non-compliance.”69
MOUs, on the other hand, are not binding but instead provide terms upon
which intergovernmental regulators will assist in investigations.70  Con-
versely, letters rogatory are requests from U.S. federal and state courts to
foreign courts to obtain evidence; foreign courts may also issue these
requests to U.S. courts, and compliance on either end is based on a notion
of comity.71
Thus, the burdens on the prosecution in gathering foreign evidence in
an FCPA case is manifest: the only binding method of doing so is through
the use of MLATs, and even those are far from a guaranteed source of
proof.  From the perspective of the target of such an investigation, the out-
looks for conducting discovery abroad are even drearier: MLATs and MOUs
are only available to government prosecutors, and letters rogatory only
become available once the government has initiated a formal proceeding.72
In this instance, the benefits of U.S. regulators deferring to foreign jurisdic-
tions to investigate and prosecute conduct that would otherwise fall within
the ambit of the FCPA makes immensely practical sense, tipping the scales
toward finding that the extraterritorial application of the FCPA in such a
case would be unreasonable.
2. The Connections Between the Regulating State and the Person
Principally Responsible for the Activity to be Regulated, or Between
That State and Those Whom the Regulation is Designed to Protect
Considering the connections between the United States and an FCPA
defendant, as well as between the United States and whom the FCPA is
designed to protect, courts should bear in mind that the FCPA carries crim-
inal penalties, including terms of imprisonment for individuals and hefty
fines for both corporate defendants and individuals.73  In general, the juris-
diction in which certain conduct occurs should determine whether con-
duct is sufficiently odious to be criminalized.74  From a theoretical
perspective, applying antibribery laws extraterritorially may impinge on
another sovereign’s ability to regulate its citizens and conflict with its
69. U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, RESPONSE OF THE UNITED STATES: QUESTIONS CONCERNING
PHASE 3 OECD WORKING GROUP ON BRIBERY §10.2 (2010), http://www.justice.gov/crimi-
nal/fraud/fcpa/docs/response3.pdf.
70. See McLean, supra note 67, at 1988 & n.60. R
71. See “Letters Rogatory” Defined, 22 C.F.R. § 92.54 (2006).
72. See Koehler, supra note 65. R
73. “For each violation of the anti-bribery provisions, the FCPA provides that corpo-
rations and other business entities are subject to a fine of up to $2 million.  Individuals,
including officers, directors, stockholders, and agents of companies, are subject to a fine
of up to $250,000 and imprisonment for up to five years.  For each violation of the
accounting provisions, the FCPA provides that corporations and other business entities
are subject to a fine of up to $25 million.  Individuals are subject to a fine of up to $5
million and imprisonment for up to 20 years.”  DOJ & SEC GUIDE, supra note 4, at 68 R
(footnote call numbers omitted).
74. See CHARLES DOYLE, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., 94-166, EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICA-
TION OF AMERICAN CRIMINAL LAW 1 & n.1 (2010) (quoting Am. Banana Co. v. United
Fruit Co., 213 U.S. 347, 356 (1909)).
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notions of appropriate relations between business and government;75 and
from a practical standpoint, U.S. intervention in foreign bribery may have a
deleterious impact on a foreign jurisdiction’s abilities and incentives to reg-
ulate bribery within its boundaries.
An example that crystallizes these concerns is the United States’ col-
lection of fines related to FCPA violations, all of which accrue to the U.S.
Treasury.76  Thus, the United States may apply the FCPA to foreign conduct
that only tangentially touches the states, and in doing so the government
may not only stamp a foreign corporation or individual as a convicted
criminal but also unilaterally convert foreign funds to U.S. dollars for gov-
ernment use.  This is so even if a foreign jurisdiction prohibits the same
bribery that the FCPA covers and if that jurisdiction (rather than the states)
would collect fines from a bribery prosecution, not to mention that once
that jurisdiction collected such fines it might distribute the monies col-
lected in a manner much differently than the U.S. government would.77
Underscoring this is the sheer amount of money that the U.S. govern-
ment has collected from foreign firms as a result of FCPA violations, an
amount that is disproportionate to fines collected from domestic firms.
Indeed, out of the top ten FCPA settlements through 2014, eight were from
foreign firms, and although thirty percent of FCPA cases are against foreign
firms, those cases made up sixty-seven percent of all FCPA fines.78  As an
example of just how much an FCPA prosecution can cost a foreign firm,
Seimens AG, a German corporation, settled FCPA charges with the DOJ for
$800 million.79  The allegations were that Siemens violated the FCPA’s
accounting and antibribery provisions, and although the DOJ obtained
jurisdiction over Siemens because the company was an issuer that was
listed on the New York Stock Exchange, the alleged bribery did not carry a
strong nexus to the United States.80  Moreover, foreign prosecutors from
Italy and Germany also investigated Siemens,81 and on top of the FCPA
fines, Siemens paid C= 395 million to German authorities for related
charges.82
FCPA fines from foreign defendants resulting from foreign conduct are
amounts that could otherwise strengthen the capabilities of foreign prose-
cutors to regulate the same conduct.  Moreover, if U.S. prosecutors were to
defer to foreign regulators in such cases, it could allow those regulators to
75. See Christopher L. Blakesley, United States Jurisdiction Over Extraterritorial
Crime, 73 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 1109, 1114– 16 (1982).
76. FCPA Fines: Where Does All the Money Go?, TRACE BLOG, http://www.traceinter-
national.org/fcpa-fines-where-does-all-the-money-go/ (last visited Nov. 8, 2015).
77. See, e.g., DAVID LAWLER, FREQUENTLY ASKED QUESTIONS ON ANTI-BRIBERY AND COR-
RUPTION 233– 34 (2012) (discussing the differences in fine collection between U.S. and
U.K. antibribery regimes).
78. Leibold, supra note 26, at 234– 36. R
79. Id. at 235.
80. Id. at 242.
81. Information at 13, United States v. Siemens Aktiengesellschaft (D.D.C. 2008)
(08-CR-367-RJL), http://www.justice.gov/sites/default/files/criminal-fraud/legacy/
2013/05/02/12-12-08siemensakt-info.pdf.
82. Leibold, supra note 26, at 243. R
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take into account the appropriate degree of government interference in
light of the needs and nuances of the foreign jurisdiction’s social, political,
and economic condition.  The global reach of the FCPA, however, may have
hampered any such development.
3. The Existence of Justified Expectations That Might be Protected or Hurt
by the Regulation
In matters of contract and business, justified expectations that a par-
ticular jurisdiction governs a certain transaction have traditionally pro-
vided a basis for applying that jurisdiction’s law.83  The rationale was that
“parties enter into contracts with forethought and are likely to consult a
lawyer before doing so.”84  And although this rationale may seem deceiv-
ingly simple, it remains true today, especially in the complex, global mar-
ketplace.  For instance, cross-jurisdictional transactions, such as complex
mergers and acquisitions, may require mountains of due diligence by
teams of lawyers.  Applying the FCPA abroad may (and, indeed, has) com-
plicated such transactions to the extent that the associated FCPA risks
become cost prohibitive.
The central danger that the FCPA poses to cross-jurisdictional M&As
is that it allows an acquiring company to be held liable for the target’s prior
FCPA violations through successor liability.85  Given the broad reach of ter-
ritorial jurisdiction under the FCPA and that the FCPA allows liability
through the activity of a firm’s agent, the operators of targets who may
never have expected that they would be subject to liability under the FCPA
may find themselves unable to do business with western companies that
are more FCPA savvy or, alternatively, an acquiring company that is una-
ware that the FCPA covers a target (or that the target has violated the FCPA)
may find itself in hot water with U.S. regulators.86  Moreover, successor
liability may leave a foreign acquirer of another foreign company doubly
flummoxed because it may not only be unforeseeable that the target had
engaged in bribery but also that the FCPA would apply to either foreign
corporation.
Given the costs of FCPA due diligence, the accumulation of these risks
may detrimentally affect business before the U.S. government even begins
an FCPA investigation.  And aside from the costs associated with due dili-
83. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 188 cmt. b (1971).
84. Id.
85. See DOJ & SEC GUIDE, supra note 4, at 28– 30; see also M&A Due Diligence and R
Successor Liability, ALLEN & OVERY, http://www.allenovery.com/publications/en-gb/
FCPA/Pages/M-and-A-due-diligence-and-successor-liability.aspx (last visited Nov. 9,
2015) (“The overarching corruption risk in the M&A context is, of course, successor
liability: The risk of buying a company that is already covered by the FCPA and that has
already violated it, leading potentially to liability for the purchaser based on pre-acquisi-
tion acts over which it had no control.”).
86. Cf. DOJ & SEC GUIDE, supra note 4, at 31 (discussing a hypothetical situation R
where an acquiring firm could not be held liable for a target’s “potentially improper
payments” where the target was not previously subject to the FCPA because it “was
neither an issuer nor a domestic concern and was not subject to U.S. territorial
jurisdiction”).
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gence itself, the resulting information may result in companies abandoning
deals in light of an insurmountable likelihood of successor liability,87 even
if the acquiring company would have installed a noncorrupt corporate cul-
ture.  Moreover, FCPA concerns will commonly inhere to transactions
involving firms with cross-border business dealings, and this itself will
make adequate due diligence all the more difficult because the target may
have complex organizational structures with multifaceted corporate cul-
tures and the necessary documentation may be difficult to access.88
In light of these difficulties and the traditional importance that justi-
fied expectations have played in matters of choice of law, U.S. courts
should be hesitant to apply the FCPA extraterritorially if doing so would
cause undue surprise to the defendant in an FCPA case.  Although this fac-
tor may not be present in every case, the uncertainty that potential succes-
sor liability may have in foreign markets represents an external effect of the
FCPA’s broad jurisdictional scope.  Thus, paying heed to this factor in indi-
vidual cases could bring about a more wide ranging positive impact.
4. The Importance of the Regulation to the International Political, Legal,
or Economic System
No doubt regulating bribery is important; indeed, the public in both
developed and emerging countries views corruption as a significant hin-
drance to progress.89  Regulators have recognized this: across the globe,
nations have followed the United States’ lead in passing the FCPA and have
entered into conventions requiring them to enact antibribery laws, leading
to the conclusion that “[i]t is only a matter of time before most of the world
will have adopted domestic legislation similar in nature to the FCPA’s anti-
bribery provisions.”90  With this in mind, the importance of enforcing the
FCPA extraterritorially becomes questionable, and although such extrater-
ritoriality may have been defensible when the United States passed the
FCPA and became a world leader in regulating corporate bribery, the newly
minted antibribery regulations in foreign jurisdictions give reason to dial
back the United States’ vigorous FCPA enforcement abroad.
87. See Adam Prestidge, Note, Avoiding FCPA Surprises: Safe Harbor From Successor
Liability in Cross-Border Mergers and Acquisitions, 55 WM. & MARY L. REV. 305, 313– 15
(2013).
88. See KPMG, M&A DUE DILIGENCE AND THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT
(2009), https://www.kpmg.com/CN/en/IssuesAndInsights/ArticlesPublications/Docu-
ments/Foreign-Corrupt-Practices-Act-200911.pdf (“Acquisition targets with complex
organisational structures, multiple reporting lines and overseas business units exercising
a degree of autonomy may also imply that an investor has to deal with multiple cultures
and an increased likelihood of the occurrence of corruption and bribery, and financial
frauds.”); Prestidge, supra note 87, at 314– 15 (“Proper diligence can be even more R
expensive and time-consuming in foreign countries where important business informa-
tion is not as easily accessible because information may only be available from unwilling
parties, from closed government records, or from outdated public records.” (footnote
call number omitted)).
89. See Gledhill, supra note 2, at 156 (quoting Coatsworth, J. et al., Strategies for
Addressing Corruption in the Americas (1999)).
90. DEMING, supra note 16, at 306. R
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As discussed above, the OECD Convention was a crucial step toward
global regulation— at the domestic level— of corruption under frameworks
similar to the FCPA.91  Other international conventions with similar objec-
tives include the Inter-American Convention Against Corruption, the
Council of European Criminal and Civil Law Conventions, the Council of
European Criminal Law Convention, the Council of Civil Law Convention,
and the United Nations Convention Against Corruption.92  Various coun-
tries have signed on to these conventions, and as of 2015, forty-one coun-
tries have signed on to the OECD Convention;93 but while some countries
have expanded their enforcement activity, others have lagged behind.
Since 2005, Transparency International, a nonprofit, nonpartisan organiza-
tion with the objective of “combat[ing] corruption in government and inter-
national business and development,”94 has assembled an annual report of
the enforcement levels that OECD signatory countries have maintained.
The report categorizes countries’ enforcement activity as ranging from
“Active Enforcement” to “Little or No Enforcement,” depending on the time
period of enforcement (the 2015 report includes enforcement actions from
2011 to 2014), a country’s share of world exports, and a point system that
weighs different enforcement activities relative to the magnitude of the
cases that a country prosecutes.95  The report provides that four countries
comprising 22.8 percent of world exports— the United States, Germany,
the United Kingdom, and Switzerland— maintain “Active Enforcement”
levels.96  Conversely, twenty countries comprising 20.5 percent of world
exports engage in little or no enforcement.97
Because the “reasonableness” analysis that I propose allows case-by-
case inquiry into whether the United States should pursue largely foreign
bribery under the FCPA, courts could take into account the extent of
antibribery enforcement in a foreign jurisdiction to determine how impor-
tant U.S. intervention may or may not be.  This factor could therefore tip
the scales toward pursuing FCPA prosecution in countries that have only
nominally signed on to the OECD Convention while deferring to other
jurisdictions engaged in active antibribery enforcement, with an eye toward
settling on a sufficient degree of deterrence.  Although the statistics dis-
91. See supra notes 14– 18.
92. See generally DEMING, supra note 16, at 309– 43. R
93. See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, EXPORTING CORRUPTION– PROGRESS REPORT 2015: ASSESS-
ING ENFORCEMENT OF THE OECD CONVENTION ON COMBATTING FOREIGN BRIBERY (2015),
http://www.transparency.org/whatwedo/publication/exporting_
corruption_progress_report_2015_assessing_enforcement_of_the_oecd.
94. Press Release, Transparency Int’l USA, TI-USA and CIPE Release Country
Reports on Implementing APEC Public Procurement Transparency Standards in Mexico,
Peru, Vietnam, Indonesia, and the Philippines (July 16, 2011), http://www.trans
parency.org/news/pressrelease/20110716_APEC_standards.
95. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 93, at 15– 17. R
96. Id. at 7.  “A country that is an Active enforcer initiates many investigation [sic]
into foreign bribery offences, these investigations reach the courts, the authorities press
charges and courts convict individuals and/or companies both in ordinary cases and in
major cases in which bribers are convicted and receive substantial sanctions.” Id. at 11.
97. Id. at 7.  “Where there is ‘Little or No Enforcement’ there is no deterrence.” Id. at
15.
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cussed above are limited to OECD Convention signatory countries, a simi-
lar analysis would be available in the case of other countries by measuring
the levels of domestic antibribery enforcement in a foreign jurisdiction as a
proxy for the importance of U.S. antibribery enforcement in that
jurisdiction.
5. The Extent to Which Another State may Have an Interest in Regulating
the Activity
Although “interest analysis” derives from U.S. conflict-of-laws doc-
trine, section 403’s consideration of the competing regulatory interests of
various jurisdictions reflects international law’s adoption of such an
approach.98  The traditional American form of interest analysis, however,
introduced in Professor Brainerd Currie’s Married Women’s Contracts,99 is
distinguishable from the form of “interest analysis” put forth in section
403.  Specifically, Currie’s interest analysis only asked whether a jurisdic-
tion has an interest in applying its law to a set of facts in light of the pur-
pose of the law and the nexus that a given set of facts has to that
purpose.100  Currie’s approach therefore did not propose balancing com-
peting interests but asked only if a given jurisdiction had an interest in
regulating a set of facts, in which case that law should apply; if multiple
jurisdictions had actual interests in applying their law, this presented a true
conflict, in which case “[t]he sensible and clearly constitutional thing for
any court to do,” Professor Currie espoused, “is to apply its own law.”101
Conversely, section 403(2)(g) by its very terms invites determining
whether other jurisdictions may have an interest in regulating a particular
set of facts.  Thus, section 403 has embraced interest balancing where two
jurisdictions may have competing interests in regulating the same set of
facts, which for our purposes would involve corrupt payments to public
officials.  In such a case, whether the payment is prohibited and, if so, what
penalty may attach to that payment, may very well depend on which juris-
diction’s law applies.  Moreover, balancing interests may allow a court to
account for cultural nuances that would render another jurisdiction’s law
more appropriate to handle a certain set of facts.  Although the next section
will consider how to approach cases where two competing jurisdictions
have conflicting law, this section proposes that to determine whether
applying the FCPA extraterritorially would be reasonable, courts should
follow section 403’s approach and conduct a searching analysis of whether
another jurisdiction may have an interest in regulating bribery rather than
the United States.
98. See ALEX MILLS, THE CONFLUENCE OF PUBLIC AND PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW: JUS-
TICE, PLURALISM AND SUBSIDIARITY IN THE INTERNATIONAL CONSTITUTIONAL ORDERING OF PRI-
VATE LAW 259 (2009).
99. See Brainerd Currie, Married Women’s Contracts: A Study in Conflict of Laws
Method, 25 U. CHI. L. REV. 227 (1958).
100. See id. at 231– 33.
101. Id. at 261.
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From a theoretical standpoint, U.S. courts have grappled with whether
the FCPA prohibits certain payments because of definitional difficulties
that another jurisdiction may otherwise have an interest in and may be
more adept at defining.  For instance, the FCPA prohibits payments to “for-
eign officials” including government “instrumentalities,”102 but whether
this encompasses employees of state-owned enterprises (SOEs)103 is
unclear from the face of the statute.  Indeed, given the complex policy deci-
sions and practical implications that a system of government favoring state
ownership over corporations presents,104 a foreign government would
likely have an interest in determining whether SOE employees should be
considered government officials such that certain payments to them consti-
tute illicit bribery.
Nevertheless, U.S. courts have agreed with the government’s position
that SOEs are government instrumentalities for FCPA purposes.105  But a
recent case out of the Eleventh Circuit Court of Appeals created a more
complicated standard for determining whether any given commercial enter-
prise is a government instrumentality subject to the FCPA.  In United States
v. Esquenazi, the court noted that it was the first court of appeals to address
the issue and held that “an entity must be under the control or dominion of
the government to qualify as an ‘instrumentality’ within the FCPA’s mean-
ing,” and in addition, “an instrumentality must be doing the business of
the government.”106  As to the first requirement, government “control” over
the entity turns on the following factors:
the foreign government’s formal designation of that entity; whether the gov-
ernment has a majority interest in the entity; the government’s ability to hire
and fire the entity’s principals; the extent to which the entity’s profits, if any,
go directly into the governmental fisc, and . . . the extent to which the gov-
ernment funds the entity if it fails to break even; and the length of time these
indicia have existed.107
The court interpreted the second element, “doing the business of the gov-
ernment,” to turn on whether “the entity performs a function the govern-
ment treats as its own.”108  In turn, this depends on yet an additional set of
factors:
whether the entity has a monopoly over the function it exists to carry out;
whether the government subsidizes the costs associated with the entity pro-
viding services; whether the entity provides services to the public at large in
the foreign country; and whether the public and the government of that for-
102. 15 U.S.C. § 78-dd– 1 (f)(1)(A) (2012).
103. Generally, a state-owned enterprise is “any corporate entity recognized by
national law as an enterprise, and in which the state exercises ownership.” ORGANISA-
TION FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION AND DEV., OECD GUIDELINES ON CORPORATE GOVERNANCE
OF STATE-OWNED ENTERPRISES 14 (2015).
104. See id. at 17 (discussing the rationales for state ownership).
105. See “State-Owned Enterprises” Under the FCPA, STEPTOE & JOHNSON LLP (June 3,
2011), http://www.steptoe.com/publications-newsletter-pdf.html/pdf/?item_id=209.
106. United States v. Esquenazi, 752 F.3d 912, 922 (11th Cir. 2014).
107. Id. at 925.
108. Id. at 926.
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eign country generally perceive the entity to be performing a governmental
function.109
Given this complex analysis, whether an SOE counts as a “government
instrumentality” remains vague, but what is as clear as day is that courts,
regulators, and businesses will continue to struggle with determining
(before facing FCPA charges) whether the FCPA applies to any given pay-
ment in the context of SOEs or other commercial enterprises with a link to
government.110  And by applying the FCPA abroad to the extent that the
U.S. government has, it has usurped, overridden, and undermined other
jurisdictions’ ability to define what payments the law should proscribe.
Furthermore, U.S. prosecution of bribery cases abroad may have cre-
ated a free rider problem whereby foreign jurisdictions have become
rationally apathetic to prosecuting those same cases.  This therefore may
have diluted any interest foreign jurisdictions may have had in creating
robust antibribery enforcement schemes.  Indeed, just as the Kyoto Proto-
col, a treaty calling for multinational environmental legislation, has suf-
fered from “free rider problems [that] make it unlikely that adequate
participation and compliance will be achieved,”111 it is not implausible
that U.S. antibribery enforcement abroad has removed an incentive from
foreign OECD Convention signatories to self-regulate.
Thus, we’ve seen not only that foreign jurisdictions may be better
suited to regulate bribery that occurs within its bounds but also that
expansive foreign antibribery enforcement at the hands of U.S. prosecutors
may result in regulatory free riding by other nations.  The better approach
in such a case is to determine whether another state has an interest in
applying its own antibribery provisions.  As we will see in the next section,
this analysis leans even further toward deferring to another jurisdiction’s
antibribery regulations when they conflict with the FCPA.
6. The Likelihood of Conflict with Regulation by Another State
Whereas the previous section considered how courts should deter-
mine whether a jurisdiction aside from the United States has an interest in
regulating bribery that occurs within its bounds, this section considers
how courts should decide what to do if both the United States and a for-
eign jurisdiction have an interest in regulating foreign bribery, and if each
jurisdictions’ regulations conflict.  The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Rela-
tions Law deals directly with this issue— section 403(3) provides that:
109. Id.
110. See Recent Cases, Foreign Corrupt Practices Act— ”Foreign Official”— Eleventh Cir-
cuit Defines “Government Instrumentality” Under the FCPA, 128 HARV. L. REV. 1500,
1500 (2015) (“Unfortunately, the court’s indeterminate and unwieldy two-pronged
instrumentality test fails to provide much-needed judicial guidance to businesses and
regulators interpreting the Act.”).
111. Scott Barrett & Robert Stavins, Increasing Participation and Compliance in Inter-
national Climate Change Agreements, 3 INT’L ENVTL. AGREEMENTS: POL. LAW & ECON. 349,
350 (2003).
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When it would not be unreasonable for each of two states to exercise juris-
diction over a person or activity, but the prescriptions by the two states are
in conflict, each state has an obligation to evaluate its own as well as the
other state’s interest in exercising jurisdiction, in light of all the relevant
factors, [including those set out in] Subsection (2); a state should defer to
the other state if that state’s interest is clearly greater.112
Thus, as opposed to Currie’s default position requiring U.S. courts to
apply the FCPA to largely foreign conduct even if the FCPA conflicted with
the foreign jurisdiction’s regulatory regime,113 section 403(3) provides a
more nuanced approach, suggesting that U.S. courts should defer to
another jurisdiction with a conflicting antibribery regime.  Nevertheless,
because this is only one of many factors that courts should consider when
deciding whether to allow an extraterritorial FCPA prosecution, courts may
lessen the weight that they give to this factor where a foreign jurisdiction
enacts a conflicting antibribery law but underenforces it.  Given the com-
plex problems that regulating foreign bribery creates, the best approach to
interest balancing in this context would consider both (a) the degree of
conflict that a foreign law presents on its face, and (b) the level of enforce-
ment as a proxy for the degree of actual conflict with the FCPA.
Three foreign jurisdictions have recently enacted regimes that stand in
fundamental conflict with the FCPA: Brazil, China, and the United King-
dom.  The remainder of this section will comparatively analyze these regu-
lations against the FCPA.
1. Brazil’s Clean Companies Act
Brazil’s economy has faltered in recent years, and corruption has
played a role in this downturn.114  For instance, Brazil’s largest investor—
the state-owned oil company, Petrobras— has recently become embroiled in
corruption charges, spurring an FCPA investigation by the SEC that could
result in fines of over $1.6 billion, which if paid would be the largest FCPA
settlement to date.115  Analysts estimate that the lessened spending as a
result of the Petrobras investigation may reduce Brazil’s GDP by a full per-
centage point.116  In addition, the Federation of Industries of the State of
Sa˜o Paulo reports, “Brazil loses 1.38% to 2.3% of its GDP in kickbacks and
bribes.”117
Despite these calls for government intervention, Brazil’s regulation of
bribery involving foreign officials has been remarkably low.  Specifically,
112. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW § 403(3) (AM. LAW INST. 1987).
113. See supra notes 99– 101 and accompanying text. R
114. See The Data Team, Economic Backgrounder: Brazilian Waxing and Waning, ECON-
OMIST (Oct. 30, 2015, 4:26 PM), http://www.economist.com/node/21645402/.
115. Jeb Blount & Mica Rosenberg, Exclusive: U.S. Graft Probes May Cost Petrobras
Record $1.6 Billion or More –  Source, REUTERS (Aug. 18, 2015, 6:58 PM), http://
www.reuters.com/article/2015/08/18/us-brazil-petrobras-corruption-idUSKCN0QN0B
B20150818#rEXAMjMmtFtrEeGo.97.
116. See The Data Team, supra note 114. R
117. OECD, PHASE 3 REPORT ON IMPLEMENTING THE OECD ANTI-BRIBERY CONVENTION IN
BRAZIL 9 (Oct. 2014).
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although fourteen allegations of bribery of foreign public officials have
come to light, since agreeing to the OECD Convention, Brazil has only
prosecuted one case as of October 2014.118  Indeed, Transparency Interna-
tional’s ranking Brazil as a country engaged in “Little or no enforcement”
since becoming a member to the OECD convention reflects this under-
enforcement.119  But this is not to say that Brazil does not have laws on the
books enabling bribery prosecutions: in 2013, President Dilma Roussef
passed an anticorruption law known as the “Clean Company Act,”120
which imposes strict liability on legal entities engaged in foreign and
domestic bribery of public officials.121
The substantive differences between the Clean Company Act and the
FCPA are numerous but two particular differences present fundamental
conflicts between the laws.  First, whereas the FCPA requires proof of “cor-
rupt intent,” the Clean Company Act is a strict liability offense that
imposes liability regardless of a defendant’s motives.122  In practice, this
makes the Clean Company Act broader than the FCPA insofar as conduct
that may create liability; moreover, this suggests that Brazil’s legislative
intent in passing the Clean Company Act was to reach more activity, and
thus spur more rigorous enforcement than the United States would impose
under the FCPA.  A second area of conflict between the Clean Company
Act and the FCPA further supports the notion that the Clean Company Act
demonstrates a legislative intent to apply more broadly and be enforced
more rigorously than the FCPA: the Clean Company Act applies to bribery
of both foreign and domestic public officials.123  Brazil’s affirmative deci-
sion to prohibit corrupt payments to its own public officials indicates that
the country wishes to clean up the manner and culture in which corpora-
tions interact with the country as a sovereign; given the corruption that has
plagued Brazil, vigorous domestic antibribery enforcement without the need
of foreign intervention could reaffirm the Brazilian public’s confidence in
its domestic government.
Thus, Brazil’s Clean Company Act exemplifies a sovereign decision to
regulate corruption independently— a decision that U.S. intervention could
compromise.  Indeed, if Brazil were able to recover fines that the U.S. com-
monly seeks in its FCPA prosecutions, the country would be better able to
pursue bribery investigations and prosecutions.  But FCPA enforcement
could decrease Brazil’s incentive to do so, creating a crutch for Brazilian
regulators.124  Thus, in FCPA cases involving Brazilian corporations or offi-
cials, U.S. courts should consider the interest that Brazil may have in prose-
118. Id.
119. TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 93, at 12. R
120. Richard C. Smith, A Comparison of Anti-Corruption Laws in US, UK, BRAZIL,
LAW360 (Apr. 3, 2015, 9:15 AM), http://www.law360.com/articles/638561/a-compari
son-of-anti-corruption-laws-in-us-uk-brazil.
121. Lei No. 12,846/2013, de 1 de Agosto de 2013, DIA´RIO OFICIAL DA UNIA˜O
[D.O.U.], Agosto 2013 (Braz.).
122. See Smith, supra note 120. R
123. Id.
124. See supra note 111 and accompanying text. R
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cuting cases independently and defer to Brazil when doing so would
further that interest.
2. China’s Anticorruption Regulations
China’s economic, political, and cultural characteristics present
prickly issues for regulating corruption and bribery.  Given its communist
foundations, many corporations in China are state owned, making such
companies’ officials potential recipients of bribes; additionally, Chinese
business culture is traditionally rooted in developing relationships via gift
giving, a practice known as guanxi.125  The confluence of these factors has
resulted in China’s public condemnation of corruption but only to a degree
that tolerates low-level payments that might otherwise be considered cor-
rupt.126  And although commentators have recognized increased supply-
side anticorruption enforcement by the People’s Republic of China (PRC),
most notably the commercial bribery conviction of a Chinese subsidiary of
pharmaceutical company GlaxoSmithKline,127 others have questioned
whether demand-side anticorruption enforcement, i.e., prosecutions of cor-
rupt government officials, has been a product of political strategy rather
than public interest.128
Against this complex backdrop, the PRC regulates corruption with a
web of regulations, the two most important of which are the Anti-Unfair
Competition Law of the PRC (AUCL) and certain sections of the PRC
Criminal Law.129  In an interesting divergence from many other anticor-
ruption regulations, China bifurcates its regulations to cover two different
sorts of corruption: whereas Article 8 of the AUCL and Article 163 of the
PRC Criminal Law cover “commercial bribery” between private persons,
PRC Criminal Law Articles 389– 95 cover “official corruption, defined as
payments to state officials.”130  But because many “private persons” will
also be employees of state-owned entities, the FCPA may also apply to con-
duct under both categories of corruption.131
Given the potential overlap between the FCPA and Chinese anticorrup-
tion regulations, conflicts between the laws are readily apparent.  First, as
opposed to solely government enforcement under the FCPA, the AUCL pro-
125. See Daniel Chow, The Interplay Between China’s Anti-Bribery Laws and the For-
eign Corrupt Practices Act, 73 OHIO ST. L.J. 1015, 1017 (2012); F. Joseph Warin, Michael
S. Diamant & Jill M. Pfenning, FCPA Compliance in China and the Gifts and Hospitality
Challenge, 5 VIRGINIA L. & BUS. REV. 33, 58– 61 (2010).
126. See Chow, supra note 125, at 1017. R
127. See Trends and Developments in Anti-Corruption Enforcement 10, COVINGTON &
BURLING LLP (2015), https://www.cov.com/files/Publication/446fa508-b853-4f88-a902-
615eb62a28aa/Presentation/PublicationAttachment/1c4f86eb-6ce7-4115-aed6-67bd2d
1e5ee6/Trends_and_Developments_in_Anti-Corruption_Enforcement_Winter_2015.pdf.
128. See generally Teresa Welsh, China’s Corruption Crackdown: Progress or Politics?,
U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP. (June 11, 2015, 7:07 PM), http://www.usnews.com/news/
articles/2015/06/11/chinas-corruption-crackdown-progress-or-politics.
129. See Chow, supra note 125, at 1025– 26. R
130. Id.
131. See, e.g., id. at 1029– 33 (discussing common scenarios where both the FCPA
and China’s commercial bribery regulations may apply).
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vides a private right of action for entities that allege harm resulting from
commercial bribery.132  Assuming that a private AUCL plaintiff would be
able to accurately monetize the harm resulting from commercial bribery, a
parallel FCPA and private AUCL prosecution could result in double recov-
ery against the offending entity; deferring to a solely Chinese resolution of
the case could therefore be a more efficient enforcement mechanism than a
dual prosecution because it could provide an accurate remedy for a
harmed Chinese entity while saving U.S. prosecutorial resources.  Second,
whereas an FCPA charge may result in a maximum term of imprisonment
of up to twenty years, a violation in the form of bribery under the PRC
Criminal Law may result in a lifetime sentence for the bribe payor.133
Thus, the potential remedial effects that Chinese corruption prosecutions
may provide, if fully imposed, could suffice to deter future violations.
Thus, even if a U.S. court may have prescriptive jurisdiction to regulate
such conduct under the FCPA, it may find that in light of the magnitude of
the actions that Chinese prosecutors and plaintiffs bring, the application of
the FCPA would be unreasonable.
3. The U.K. Bribery Act of 2010
Passed in 2010, the U.K. Bribery Act bears a close resemblance to the
FCPA, applying extraterritorially and prohibiting bribery to foreign offi-
cials, but it presents various important differences.134  The United King-
dom’s level of enforcement is also comparable to that of the United States;
indeed, Transparency International places the United Kingdom among the
four OECD signatory countries with “active enforcement” levels.135  At the
outset, this therefore increases the degree of actual conflict between the
FCPA and the Bribery Act.  For companies doing business in both the
United States and the United Kingdom, the threat of liability under both
the Bribery Act and the FCPA presents grave risks and incentives to imple-
ment comprehensive compliance programs.  But given a number of facial
conflicts between the laws, cases that are amenable to both FCPA and Brib-
ery Act prosecutions may present reason for the United States to dial back
a vigorous application of the FCPA where the Bribery Act also applies.
The Bribery Act creates three separate offenses for 1) bribing another
person (including offenses for both the payor and payee), 2) bribing a for-
eign official, and 3) failing to prevent bribery.136  The third offense
presents an important dissimilarity from the FCPA: a commercial organiza-
132. Lei Li, Anti-Commercial Bribery Laws in China and Their Enforcement in the Phar-
maceutical Industry, 2 BLOOMBERG L. REPS.— WHITE COLLAR CRIME (2010), http://
www.sidley.com/~/media/Files/Publications/2010/11/AntiCommercial%20Bribery%
20Laws%20in%20China%20and%20Their%20E__/Files/View%20Article/FileAttach
ment/sidley_lei_li_article.
133. See Wantao Yang et al., Understanding China’s Approach to Anticorruption, CORP.
COUNSEL (Jan. 28, 2014), http://www.mmlawus.com/Data/Files/Articles/Corporate%
20Counsel%20China%20article.pdf.
134. See Bribery Act of 2010, c. 23 (U.K.).
135. See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, supra note 93, at 12. R
136. Bribery Act of 2010, c. 23 (U.K.).
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tion may be liable under the Bribery Act “if a person associated with it
bribes another person intending to obtain or retain business or an advan-
tage in the conduct of business for that organization”; however, an affirma-
tive defense for the organization is available if it can “show that despite a
particular case of bribery it nevertheless had adequate procedures in place
to prevent persons associated with it from bribing.”137  A further difference
between this offense and the FCPA is that it imposes strict liability for fail-
ure to prevent bribery, whereas the FCPA requires corrupt intent.138  And
two other conflicts are present where the FCPA provides defenses that the
Bribery Act does not include: 1) the FCPA creates an exception for facilitat-
ing payments intended to “expedite or secure the performance of a ‘routine
governmental action,’” and 2) the FCPA provides an affirmative defense for
promotional expenses that are “reasonable and bona fide business
expenses that are directly related to the promotion, demonstration or
explanation of products or services.”139
Given these differences in what conduct may or may not create liabil-
ity, the extraterritorial application of either the FCPA or the Bribery Act,
albeit a permissible exercise of prescriptive jurisdiction, may nonetheless
be unreasonable.  For example, in cases involving firms operating in both
the United States and United Kingdom, where an initial investigation by
U.S. regulators turns up evidence that the target of an investigation either
made a permissible facilitating payment or promotional expenditure, fur-
ther investigatory resources need not be expended if U.K. regulators are
also pursuing the same activity because that activity would not likely
escape the grasp of the Bribery Act.  And more generally, because the Brib-
ery Act applies more broadly than the FCPA by allowing prosecutions of
both bribers and bribees, a Bribery Act prosecution may be more efficient
than bringing parallel FCPA charges against only the briber.
Conclusion
Given the current state of FCPA enforcement, decreased prosecutorial
vigilance is unlikely.  But the answer to the complex issues that the extra-
territorial application of the FCPA presents is not to give in to the U.S.
government’s aggressive application of the FCPA but rather to challenge
this approach in court.  Successful challenges would allow other jurisdic-
tions to develop regulatory regimes that could take into account the
nuances of their respective cultures, polities, economies, and societies,
while continuing to provide cross-jurisdictional cooperation and assistance
where necessary.  In the short term, this may call for more attention to
bribery and corruption from jurisdictions that have historically relied on
the efforts of U.S. prosecutors; in the long term, however, governmental
investment in the regulation of corruption will become a self-sustaining
137. MINISTRY OF JUSTICE, THE BRIBERY ACT 2010: GUIDANCE 15 (2011).
138. See TRANSPARENCY INT’L, THE 2010 UK BRIBERY ACT: ADEQUATE PROCEDURES 12
(2010).
139. Id.
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task and will allow foreign countries to define corruption and its conse-
quences in light of their particular social, economic, and political needs.
Although a global approach to the FCPA may have been appropriate at
one point in time, given the development of competing legislation abroad,
the time has come to sunset the FCPA’s vigorous enforcement platform.
From the perspective of the United States, this will allow more focus on
domestic issues by freeing up prosecutorial resources that were otherwise
invested in prosecuting cases with only tangential links to or effects on the
United States.  Moreover, easing off of such cases and deferring to other
jurisdictions would fulfill the original purpose of the FCPA— fostering trust
and beneficial relations between the United States and foreign countries.
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